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PORTIA'S PROGRESS: WOMEN AS LAWYERS
REFLECTIONS ON PAST AND FUTURE**
Mary Jane Mossman*
This article reviews the history ofjudicial decisions concerning
the admission of women to the legal profession in Canada and
elsewhere. It further explores the impact of history on women
as lawyers and particularly the use of arguments about gender
differences. Some implications of these arguments for women
currently practising law are also considered in light of recent
literature about the essential nature of men and women's ethical
development. Current issues for women - and men - who
are practising law are explored as well
Les Progres de Portia
Le present article passe en revue l'histoire des jugements
juridiques sur l'admission des femmes comme avocates,
prononcds au Canada et ailleurs. 1l examine l'effet de l'histoire
sur les avocates, et notamment l'utilisation des arguments
allfguant les diffirences entre les deux sexes, arguments dont il
considbre 9galement les incidences pour les femmes qui exercent
actuellement la profession d'avocate, 6 la lumiere des travaux
rcents sur la nature essentielle du ddveloppement ithique chez
les hommes et les femmes Enfin il traite de quelques questions
qui se posent aux femmes - et aux hommes tout aussi bien
- qui exercent aujourd'huL
I. ADMITTING WOMEN AS MEMBERS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION
The 'persons' cases were aptly named because they were about
whether women were included in the legal interpretation of the
word 'persons'. . . Not surprisingly perhaps, the three earliest of
the 'persons' cases were initiated by two women who wanted to
become lawyers.'
* Associate Professor, Osgoode Law School, York University, Toronto,
Ontario.
** An earlier version of this paper was presented to a Continuing Education
Program of the Law Society of Upper Canada (May 1986) and to the
Annual Institute of the Canadian Bar Association Ontario (February
1988). For research assistance on women in the legal profession over a
number of years, the author gratefully acknowledges the efforts of Ms.
Eleanor Meslin, Ms. Nancy Riley, Mr. James Sprague, Ms. Susan Vella
and Ms. Sheilagh O'Connell, all at Osgoode Hall Law School. The
technical assistance of Mrs. Hazel Pollack is also warmly appreciated.
Beverley Baines, "Women and the Law," in Sandra Burt, Lorraine Code
and Lindsay Dorney eds., Changing Patterns: Women in Canada (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 1988), 157, 159.
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Women as Lawyers
In 1897, Clara Brett Martin was admitted as a lawyer in
Ontario, the first woman to be admitted to the practice of law
in the British Commonwealth. 2 Her admission to the legal
profession was achieved only after a determined effort on her part
3
to achieve the necessary legislative reform, but her success in
Ontario did not noticeably improve the opportunities for women
to enter the legal profession in other jurisdictions in Canada.
Mabel Penury French was similarly denied admission to the
profession by the courts in both New Brunswick (1905) 4 and
British Columbia (1912) 5, and like Clara Brett Martin, achieved
her goal of admission in both these provinces only after legislative
action.6 Ironically, the minutes of the Benchers in British Columbia
for April 1, 1912, ignoring her special accomplishment, record the
call of "twenty gentlemen, including Mabel Penury French."
7
The first women lawyers were admitted in the western provinces
shortly after Mabel French's admission in British Columbia: in
Manitoba and Alberta in 1915, and in Saskatchewan in 1972.8
The eastern provinces admitted the first women as lawyers a little
later: in Nova Scotia in 1918, in Prince Edward Island in 1926,
and in Newfoundland in 1933.9 In Quebec, where the court had
2 Clara Brett Martin was admitted as a barrister and solicitor in 1897. Her
original petition for admission was denied by the Law Society of Upper
Canada, but the Ontario Legislature eventually passed two statutes, one
permitting the admission of women as solicitors in 1892 (55 V. c.32, s.1)
and the other permitting their admission as barristers-at-law in 1895 (58
V. c.27, s.l). For an excellent account of Clara Brett Martin's efforts to
become eligible for admission to the legal profession, see Constance
Backhouse, "'To Open the Way for Others of my Sex': Clara Brett Martin's
Career as Canada's First Woman Lawyer" (1985), 1 Can. J. Women and
the Law 1.
3 See Backhouse, supra note 2, 7-21.
4 In re French (1905), 37 N.B.R. 359.
5 In reFrench, [1912] 1 D.L.R. 80.
6 Alfred Watts, Q.C., History of the Legal Profession in British Columbia
(1869-1984) (Law Society of British Columbia, 1984), 133-34. Watts notes
the concerted efforts to obtain the necessary amendments in British
Columbia. He also records that the Law Society "rather ungallantly, and
contrary to what had happened to (sic) New Brunswick, [collected] its costs"
in the appeal to the Court of Appeal. Id. For the statutory amendments,
see 6 Ed. VII, c.5 (1906) for New Brunswick; and 2 Geo. V, c.18 (1912)
for British Columbia.
7 Watts, id, 134.
8 Cameron Harvey, "Women in Law in Canada" (1970-71), 4 Man. LJ 9.
According to Harvey, Melrose Sissons and Winnifred M. Wilton were the
first women lawyers admitted in Manitoba, and Lillian Ruby Clements the
first in Alberta. The first women to earn LL.B. degrees in these provinces
were Mrs. I.R. (Adamson) Hunt, Q.C. in Manitoba in 1917 and Ethel Fagan
in Alberta in 1921. The first woman admitted to the legal profession in
Saskatchewan was Mary Cathcart, while the first to complete the LL.B.
degree there was Elsie Hall in 1920. Id., 17.
9 In Nova Scotia, the first woman admitted was Frances Fish; in Prince
Edward Island, Roma Steward; and in Newfoundland, Louisa Maud
Saunders. Harvey, id., 17.
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denied Annie Macdonald Langstaff's application for admission in
1915,10 women were not admitted as lawyers until as recently as
1942. 1 Even then, there was "violent opposition" on the part of
members of the Quebec bar to the legislative amendment
permitting women to become lawyers.'
2
During the early years of this century, women were routinely
denied admission as lawyers in other parts of the British
Commonwealth as well. In 1901, a court in Scotland denied the
admission of a woman as a Law Agent, 13 even though the relevant
statute used the gender-neutral word "persons" in describing the
admission requirements. In the same case, the court discounted
counsel's submission that there was an ancient precedent in the
appearance of Lady Crawford as an advocate in the High Court
of Scotland in 1563.14
Similarly, in 1903, when Bertha Cave applied to join Gray's Inn
as a barrister, the Benchers of the Inn denied her application. 15
On her appeal to a special tribunal, the Benchers argued that no
female had ever been admitted to the Inns of Court, and the
tribunal decided, in the absence of a precedent, to deny her
application accordingly. 16 A few years later, the Law Society in
England denied an application from a woman to become a
solicitor, even though the Solicitors' Act referred to the admission
of "persons." When Ms. Bebb applied to the court for a declaration
as to her eligibility, the three judges of the Chancery Division
concluded that there was no precedent for the admission of
women, despite the use of the word "persons" in the statute, and
denied her application. 7 It was only after World War I that
women in England became eligible to join the legal profession
there. 18
10 Langstaff v. Bar of Quebec, (1915), 25 Que. KB. 11.
The first women to be admitted were Elizabeth C. Monk and Suzanne R.
Filion. Harvey, supra note 8, 17.
12 From the memorandum prepared by Elizabeth C. Monk in 1965, and
quoted at some length by Harvey, supra note 8, 18-20. According to Monk,
"despite the dire foreboding of the earlier generation of members of the
Bar, the profession has survived the infiltration." Id
13 Hall v. Incorp. Society of Law Agents (1901), 3 Session Cases, 5th ser.,
1059.
14 Albie Sachs and Joan Hoff Wilson, Sexism and the Law (Martin Robertson,
1978), 27-28.
15 Id., 28.
16 The Times (3 December 1903); as quoted by Sachs and Wilson, supra note
14, 239.
'7 Bebb v. Law Society (1913), 29 T.L.R. 634, 109 L.T. 36, 57 Sol. Jo. 663;
aff'd [1914] 1 Ch. 286 (C.A.).
18 The enactment of the Sexual Disqualification Removal Act of 1919 created
the opportunity for women to be admitted as lawyers; see (1922), 58 C.LJ
245, as quoted by Harvey, supra note 8. See also Jocelynne Scutt, "Sexism
in Legal Language" (1985), 59 Australian LJ 163 for some information
on women lawyers in Australia.
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However, women had been admitted as lawyers in some parts
of the United States in the latter part of the nineteenth century.
In 1870, Ada Kepley was the first woman to obtain a university
degree in law when she graduated from the Union College of Law
(now Northwestern). 19 The previous year, in 1869, Arabella
Mansfield became the first woman to be admitted to the bar of
any state when Iowa admitted her as a lawyer.
20
However, in 1873 the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed a lower
court decision that Myra Bradwell was not eligible for admission
to the Chicago bar. 21 Similarly in 1875, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court denied Lavina Goodell admission to the state bar,22 and then
reversed its own decision in 1879 and granted her a license to
practice law. 23 In 1894, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a lower
court decision denying Belva A. Lockwood the right to practice
law in Virginia on the ground that the word "person" meant "male
person." 24 Moreover, women remained ineligible for admission to
many university law schools in the United States until quite
recently: Columbia first admitted women law students in 1929,
Harvard not until 1950, the University of Notre Dame in 1969
and "the last male bastion, Washington and Lee University in
1972."25
Even in Ontario, however, where the admission of women as
lawyers was permitted after 1897, the number of women admitted
to the legal profession was not significant for many decades. The
records of the Law Society of Upper Canada show that only one
woman was admitted as a lawyer in each of the years 1902, 1907,
1908, and 1913.26 Thus at the outbreak of World War I, there
were only 5 women (including Clara Brett Martin) who had been
admitted as lawyers in Ontario. By 1920, a total of 22 women
had been admitted, and an additional 49 were admitted in the
decade 1921-30. In the following decade, however, only 32
women joined the profession, but the numbers increased again for
1941-50 when 48 women became lawyers. The numbers increased
steadily but slowly after 1950, with 64 women joining the legal
profession for 1951-60 and 98 for 1961-70.27
Thus by 1970, a total of 313 women had been admitted as
lawyers in Ontario in the 73 years after Clara Brett Martin's initial
19 D. Kelly Weisberg, "Barred from the Bar: Women and Legal Education
in the United States, 1870-1890" in D. Kelly Weisberg, ed., Women and
the Law, vol. 11 (Shenkman, Mass.: 1982), 231.
20 Id.
21 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130 (1873).
22 In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232 (1875).
23 In re Goodell, 48 Wis. 693 (1879). See also Sachs and Wilson, supra note
14, 96-97.
24 In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894). See also Weisberg, supra note 19,
232.
25 Weisberg, supra note 19, 232.
26 Printout of numbers of women admitted to the bar of Ontario obtained
from the computer records of the Law Society of Upper Canada.
27 Id.
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success. Since 1970, moreover, the numbers have increased much
more rapidly. Most university law schools in Ontario now admit
between one-third and one-half women to the LL.B. programs
each year, and there have been corresponding increases in the
number of women admitted to the bar as lawyers.28 For the first
time, in the fall of 1985, more than 50% of the entering class
of an Ontario law school were women students - at the University
of Windsor law school.29
II. THE IMPACT OF HISTORY ON WOMEN AS LAWYERS
History is a retelling of the human experience. To give meaning
to that experience, we focus the beams of memory and research
on certain events, people, and places, leaving others in the
shadows.
30
From a historical perspective, women have been lawyers in
Canada for only a very short time. It is not yet one hundred years
since Clara Brett Martin was admitted in Ontario, and just over
forty years since Elizabeth Monk was admitted in Quebec. As a
result, most women who are lawyers in Canada today will be "first
generation women lawyers" in their families. A few may have a
mother who became a lawyer and a very few may have a
grandmother. 3' Yet, most women lawyers now in practice in
Canada will be the first female persons in their families to enter
the legal profession.3 2 Thus, the absence of familial role models
28 At Osgoode Hall Law School in the fall of 1985, 128 of 320 students
were women (40%); according to Andrew Ranachan, the Admissions
Officer for the school, "if all the women who were accepted had registered,
more than half of the first year student body would be women." Obiter
Dicta, October 21, 1985.
29 As reported by the Globe and Mail, January 29, 1986. The Globe story
also reported that women students have outnumbered men in the university
law schools of Quebec for a number of years: there have been more women
than men in the first year classes at Laval since 1979 and at the University
of Montreal since 1981. The story also quotes Professor Brent Cotter at
Dalhousie University as asserting that "The quality of women who apply
[to law schools in common law Canada] is somewhat better than the
quality of the men."
30 Veronica Strong-Boag and Anita Clair Fellman, Rethinking Canada: The
Promise of Women's History (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1986), 1.
31 The possibility that there is a woman lawyer who is now a "third
generation" practicing woman lawyer in her family may be unlikely, since
impressionistic evidence suggests that women who became lawyers in
earlier generations made clear choices between marriage and family on
one hand or the practice of law on the other. Thus a "third generation"
woman lawyer would be likely to have had a non-practicing lawyer for
a grandmother, and even perhaps a mother.
32 There are a number of interesting case studies of such women lawyers in
the United States in Jill Abramson and Barbara Franklin, Where They Are
Now: The Story of the Women of Harvard Law 1974 (New York:
Doubleday, 1986); the authors generally assess the women who entered
Harvard Law School in 1971 and graduated in 1974.
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for women lawyers may have contributed to some unique stress
faced by women as lawyers, 33 because their role as lawyers is new,
not only to those who are women lawyers, but also to male lawyers
and to society as a whole.
34
Moreover, the number of women lawyers in the profession has
been significant for just over a decade. Although women began
to enter law schools in large numbers in Ontario (and in the rest
of Canada) in the late 60's and early 70's, it is only within the
last decade that the number of women called to the bar of Ontario
in any one year has been over one-third of the class. 35 Many
women now entering the profession have not experienced the
barriers faced by Clara Brett Martin or the difficulties sometimes
encountered by women who became lawyers in the 30's and 40'S,36
or even the 50's and 60's. Like Mary Appleby, who wrote of her
expectations in Obiter Dicta in 1934, new women lawyers now
join the legal profession confident that "the time will come in the
not too distant future when women will win equal distinction with
men in every phase of the practice of law."
37
Even as the numbers of women lawyers increase,38 however, the
33 See Rosabeth Moss Kanter, "Reflections on Women and the Legal
Profession: A Sociological Perspective" (1978), 1 Harvard Women's Law
J. 1. For a different perspective, see Winter, "Women Work Harder, Are
Paid Less, but They're Happy" (1983), 69 ABAJ 1384. More recently, the
ABA Commission on Women in the Profession reported that "most
participants at the hearings expressed frustration and disillusionment that
barriers are still great and that progress has been far slower than expected.
Witnesses cautioned that we must not be lulled into complacency about
the status of women in the profession simply because the numbers of
women entering the profession continue to increase." Summary of Hearings,
ABA Commission on Women in the Profession (February 1988). For further
information see the special issue on "Women in Law," ABAJ (June 1988).
34 Abramson and Franklin report a survey conducted by the American Bar
Association in 1984 which revealed that 65% of male lawyers had no
female colleagues at work. The same survey showed that the median
income for male lawyers was $53,000 and that for women lawyers it was
$33,000. Forty-five per cent of men queried said that the influx of women
into the profession was only a "somewhat favourable" development and
would have only minor consequences; in contrast, 70% of the women
surveyed called it an "extremely favourable" development and predicted
major consequences. See Abramson and Franklin, supra note 32, 299.
15 See printout of sex of members by year of call, Law Society of Upper
Canada, Materials on Women in the Legal Profession (1986), B- 1.
36 For a study of women lawyers who graduated from law schools in three
cities in the United States in the 1930's and 40's, see Ronald Chester,
Unequal Access: Women Lawyers in A Changing America (Mass.: Bergin and
Garvey, 1985). Some information about women lawyers in Ontario during
the same period appears in my review of Chester in (1986), 2 Can. J.
Women and the Law 178.
37 Obiter Dicta, January 17, 1934.
38 In her review of Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Women in Law (New York: Basic
Books, 1982), Carrie Menkle-Meadow stated the issue baldly:
we are informed that the numbers of women entering legal practice has
Vol 8
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issue of what equality means for women in the legal profession
remains elusive.
39
Moreover, there are some indications that the opportunities for
women in law are not in fact equal, and that there may be some
subtle distinctions based on a male standard of what it is to be
a lawyer. Professor Menkle-Meadow has suggested, for example,
that:
Some law firms proudly proclaim their commitment to maternity
leaves and 'flexible' working arrangements for women lawyers with
children, but many women who have availed themselves of such
plans have quietly acknowledged that they are never again accepted
as serious members of their firms ... if women want to be
successful in the corporate firm context they are going to have to
do it by adopting the male work norms.
40
A man who wanted to have flexible work hours to accommodate
family responsibilities might well be treated just the same. Yet the
equal treatment of men and women, in the context of a prevailing
social pattern where women have significant family responsibilities
and men do not, underlines that equality here really means that
women (and men) must conform to the male norm or definition
of what it is to be a successful lawyer.
In exploring the nature of women's place in the legal profession
of the 1980's, the history of their admission as lawyers is therefore
critical. At the turn of the century when women began to challenge
male exclusivity in the professions 41, the reason that was routinely
increased dramatically in the past ten years .... One is tempted to ask,
so what? What difference does it make that there are now many more
women law students, lawyers, law professors, and judges? What
difference for the profession, what difference for women, what difference
for the practice of law,. . . and what difference for society?
See Carrie Menkle-Meadow, "Women in Law? A Review of Cynthia Fuchs
Epstein's Women in Law, [1983] American Bar Foundation Res. J. 189. See
also Professor Epstein's response at [1983] American Bar Foundation Res.
J. 1006.
39 The idea of sex equality in the law, and its implications for society, has
been explored in recent years in some detail. In the American context, see
Ann Scales, "Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence" (1981), 56 Ind Law J.
375; Wendy Williams, "The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture,
Courts and Feminism" (1983), 7 Women's Rights Law Rev. 175; and
Catharine MacKinnon, "Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An
Agenda for Theory", [19821 Signs 515. In the United Kingdom, see
Katherine O'Donovan, Sexual Divisions in Law (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicholson, 1985). In Canada, see "Equality" in the Introduction section
of the Charter of Rights Education Fund, Report on the Statute Audit
Project; Katherine de Jong, "On Equality and Language" in the Report on
the Statute Audit Project, 1.1; and Angela Miles, "Feminism, Equality and
Liberation" (1985), 1 Can. J. Women and the Law, 42. In all of this theory
about sex equality in law, very little attention has been paid to the equality
issue of women as lawyers.
40 Menkle-Meadow, supra note 38, 197.
41 See Sachs and Wilson, supra note 14, for an analysis of the underlying
rationale for male exclusivity in the professions.
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given to justify prevailing arrangements was that women were
different from men. 42 In Mabel French's case in the Court of
appeal of New Brunswick, for example, Mr. Justice Barker adopted
the "separate spheres" doctrine of Bradwell v. Illinois,43 decided
by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1873:
... the civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized
a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man
and woman. Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender.
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil
life. The constitution of the family organization, which is founded
in the divine ordinance as well as in the nature of things, indicates
the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain
and functions of womanhood.. .. The paramount destiny and
mission of women are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife
and mother.4
4
This judicial statement accepted the existence of a fundamental
difference between male and female which determined appropriate
roles for men and women in society at large, confining women
to the private sphere while reserving the public sphere for men.
45
The only appropriate response to assertions like Mr. Justice
Barker's from women like Clara Brett Martin, Mabel Penury
French, and Annie Macdonald Langstaff was that women were
not different from men in any aspect relevant to being a lawyer.
Their assertions that women were not different from men and that
women could practice law too were ultimately successful. Yet,
from the perspective of history, their effort to succeed with these
42 The idea that women were intrinsically different from men was well-
established in the dominant religious and men was well-established in the
dominant religious and philosophical literature at the end of the nineteenth
century. Calvinist thought, in particular, regarded men and women as equal
in the eyes of God, but considered that women were subordinate to men
according to God's divinely-created "social order". John Stuart Mill, the
champion of equal rights for women, concluded that equal rights to
education, political life, and the professions could be granted only to single
women; the role of married women was in the family. Even the burgeoning
scientific developments at the turn of the century tended to reinforce the
ideas of innate sex differences that were social as well as biological. Some
of these ideas are explored in Rosemary Radford Reuther, Sexism and God-
Talk Toward a Feminist Theology (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983); Susan
Moller Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1979); and Elizabeth Fee, "Woman's Nature and
Scientific Objectivity" in Marian Low and Ruth Hubbard, eds., Woman's
Nature: Rationalizations of Inequality (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983).
43 Supra note 21.
44 Supra note 4, 365-366.
45 The public/private distinction in the context of sex discrimination has been
usefully explored recently by O'Donovan, supra note 39, especially at
chapter 1; and in Frances Olsen, "The Family and the Market: A Study
of Ideology and Legal Reform" (1983), 96 Harv. L Rev. 1497.
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arguments helped to confirm for everyone, men as well as women,
that the definition of "lawyer" was essentially male, and that
women who chose to become lawyers had to conform to such a
(male) standard.
The adoption of this standard has had a significant impact on
women lawyers, and has sometimes even discouraged frank
discussion of equality for women lawyers. When Professor Harvey
conducted his survey on women in the profession in the early
1970's, Marguerite Ritchie, Senior Advisory Counsel in the
Department of Justice in Ottawa, cautioned him about relying on
all the responses he would receive:
You may discover that some replies indicate an apparent lack of
discrimination; in many cases I have found that women are
unwilling to admit discrimination, either because they are trying to
conceal the fact from themselves or because they must play the
role of 'Uncle Tom' and that their chances of promotion depend
absolutely upon their conformity to and acceptance of the existing
patterns.
46
Yet, despite this reluctance to express their concerns, most
women lawyers have experienced some difficulties because of the
prevailing (male) standard in the profession. When young lawyers
are expected to work very long hours, it is married women 47 with
families more often than married men with families who find this
expectation so overwhelming. 48 In this context, a woman lawyer
can "succeed" only by conforming to the male standard of
lawyering: a competent professional without significant family
interests or responsibilities. 49
Thus, the history of women's entry into the legal profession had
a lasting impact on ideas about women as lawyers. The need to
ignore "differences" to overcome legal arguments supporting male
exclusivity in the legal profession inevitably affected both men's
and women's perceptions of "lawyering" as male activity. For this
reason, questions about whether it makes any difference that Clara
Brett Martin surmounted all obstacles to be admitted to the legal
profession, or whether it is significant that large number of women
are now entering the legal profession must take account of the
gendered nature of lawyers' roles. If the definition of a successful
lawyer remains constant, then it matters very little whether there
are more women who are lawyers, or none at all. On the other
hand, if women as lawyers have something different to offer to
46 As quoted in Harvey, supra note 8, 13. Ritchie is the author of two articles
on latent sexism in legislative drafting: "Alice Through the Statutes"
(1975), 21 McGill LJ. 685; and "The Language of Oppression - Alice
Talks Back" (1977), 23 McGill LJ. 535. The latter article is a response
to a critique of her first article; see Elmer Driedger, "Are Statutes Written
for Men Only?" (1976), 22 McGill LJ 666.
47 See Carillo, "Lawyers as Mothers" (1983), 10 Barrister 7.
48 Epstein, supra note 38.
49 See Abramson and Franklin, supra note 32, 21-70.
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the profession and to the community, then their participation in
the profession matters very much indeed.
Such a question may be approached from several different
perspectives. From the perspective of individual life choices and
opportunities, it is significant that women may now become
lawyers, whether or not they must conform to an existing male
standard in doing so. The roles apparently open to women in the
1980's, including those as lawyers, are roles that could not have
been contemplated a few generations ago. These new opportunities
for women have intrinsic value for individuals, a sentiment
epitomized in the statement of an Osgoode student who wrote in
1966 that she saw no reason "more than her male colleagues [why
she] had to justify particularly why she was at law school - she
was there for the same idealistic or materialistic reasons."
50
Beyond the importance of career choices for individuals, what
is the significance of a profession which has been exclusively male
being rapidly transformed into one composed equally of men and
women. If we put aside the history of women's entry into the
profession, and the arguments about sex differences used both to
thwart and to achieve that goal, we might try to imagine what
would be the definition of "lawyer" if women as well as men had
been involved from the beginning in articulating it. Would it make
any difference to the pattern of legal work, to the style of
"successful" advocacy, to the ethical standards accepted by legal
professionals? Beyond the value of liberty for women (like men)
to have individual choices and opportunities for satisfying work,
do women as lawyers have anything to offer now that is different
from the contributions men have made historically?
III. "DIFFERENCE" AND "EQUALITY" FOR WOMEN
LAWYERS
The liberal belief in formal equality leaves untouched issues of
power and privilege.51
Some recent work by psychologist Carol Gilligan 52 has offered
some stimulating ideas about these questions. Gilligan conducted
studies of the development of moral and ethical ideas in children
and young adults. Unlike many psychological research projects in
this field,53 Gilligan used both male and female subjects, and
carefully noted differences in their responses.
One of the most interesting examples in her research concerned
the responses of an eleven-year-old boy called Jake, and those of
50 Miss M.V. MacLean, Obiter Dicta, January 1966; as quoted by Harvey,
supra note 8, 13.
51 Katherine O'Donovan, supra note 39.
52 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1982).
53 According to Gilligan, theories on ethical development proposed by
psychologists such as Piaget, Kohlberg, and Erickson are based on studies
using male subjects only.
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a little girl of the same age called Amy, to a hypothetical ethical
dilemma. 54 The hypothetical dilemma concerned a man called
Heinz whose wife was dying of cancer; her death could be
prevented by a special drug, available at the drug store nearby,
but Heinz could not afford to buy it. The dilemma presented to
the children was whether Heinz should steal the drug.
Jake responded that life is more important than property, and
that Heinz should therefore steal the drug. Amy's response was
much less assured. She appeared to be diffident about resolving
the problem, and hesitated to make a choice between the parties.
Her "solution" to the dilemma posed by Gilligan was a suggestion
that perhaps Heinz and the druggist should try to talk about it,
so that the druggist could come to understand the problem from
Heinz's perspective. Perhaps they could work out a mutually
satisfying solution, such as a credit transaction or a loan, or the
possibility that Heinz could work part-time for the druggist.
In Gilligan's psychological terms, Jake has explored the
hypothetical dilemma with the "logic of justice" while Amy has
used the "ethic of care"; and Amy scores lower in terms of
psychological theory than Jake because she is unable to separate
the abstract values from the people involved and the relations
between them. 55 In terms of psychological theory, Jake's
"separateness" and ability for abstract reasoning, contrasted with
Amy's "connectedness" and propensity for reasoning in terms of
relationships, derives from their different experiences in growing
up; a boy must separate his sexual identity from his mother while
a girl need not do so. Even so, Gilligan does not claim that the
two voices are exclusively gender-based, although the different
voice she describes has been empirically associated with women.56
In terms of lawyering, Jake's "mode of thought" appears to be
that of a good lawyer. He abstracts the values from the personal
dilemma presented to him, identifies the issues, and decides which
party's interest should take priority. By contrast, Amy's response
is harder to assess. She is slower to respond and more indecisive
than Jake. She will not accept the hypothetical as given, but wants
to change the facts or get more facts. She is uncomfortable with
her role as decision-maker, and wants the parties themselves to
be involved in finding the solution. She is concerned about the
impact of the decision on the longer-term relations of the parties;
she worries that if Heinz steals the drug, he will go to jail, and
that will prevent him from caring for his wife.57
54 Gilligan, supra note 52, 25-29.
55 Id, 30-31.
56 But this association is not absolute, and the contrasts between male and
female voices are presented here to highlight a distinction between two
modes of thought and to focus a problem of interpretation rather than





Is Amy a good lawyer? Carrie Menkle-Meadow's response is
positive. In her view, Amy is a good lawyer, albeit a different one,
because she does not accept the inevitability of the existing
system:
58
Instead of concluding that a choice must be made between life and
property, [as Jake does] ... Amy sees no need to hierarchically
order the claims. Instead, she tries to account for all the parties'
needs, and searches for a way to find a solution that satisfies the
needs of both .... In short, she won't play by the adversarial rules.
She searches outside the system for a way to solve the problem,
trying to keep both parties in mind.59
According to Menkle-Meadow, Amy also rejects her role as
neutral third party arbiter, confined to using only the information
she has available in making her decision. Amy's concern to have
the parties talk to each other "to appreciate the importance of each
other's needs" 60 suggests to Menkle-Meadow the importance of
alternate dispute resolution techniques, and the possibility that:
... the growing strength of women's voice in the legal profession
may change the adversarial system into a more cooperative, less
war-like system of communication between disputants in which
solutions are mutually agreed upon rather than dictated by an
outsider, won by the victor, and imposed upon the loser.
61
On the basis of Gilligan's analysis, therefore, the admission of
women to the legal profession carries with it the possibility of
transformation, both within the legal profession and also in the
legal system itself. Rather than a negative concept used to exclude
women from entering the profession, the idea of "difference" in
Gilligan's terms is a positive and transforming concept.
Yet, despite the attractiveness of difference as a transforming
concept, many women lawyers have ambivalent reactions to
Gilligan's analysis. Although there is some feeling of identity with
Amy's wish to solve problems in a more creative way, there is
also reluctance to fully embrace the idea of "difference", used so
often in the past to prevent women from fully participating in
public life. Menkle-Meadow's hesitation, for example, is evident
in her conclusion that Gilligan's ideas should be accepted only
tentatively at present:
.. how will the 'women are different' argument play itself out in
current legal disputes? Many of us feel the differences every day.
What we deplore is when they are used to oppress or disempower
us or when they are used as immutable stereotypes that prevent
58 Carrie Menkle-Meadow, "Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a
Woman's Lawyering Process," [1985] Berkeley Women's L J. 39.
59 Id, 51.
60 Id.
61 Id, 55. Menkle-Meadow also explores in her paper the effect of women
lawyers on the structure and style of law practice, the nature of legal
reasoning, and the content of laws.
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recognition of individual variations .... My point of view is that
while we are observing the differences we might ask if we have
something to learn from them.
62
Christine Boyle's analysis of the feminist judge in the context
of sexual assault cases implicitly takes up Menkle-Meadow's
challenge.63 According to Boyle, the experience of men and
women in relation to sexuality may be quite different, and a
feminist judge "would [therefore] avoid propositions that are
abstracted to the level that they are gender neutral when she is
dealing with an area in which gender is significant." 64 On this
basis, Boyle argues that the different experiences of men and
women with sexuality may need to be taken into account expressly
in cases of sexual assault.
In another context, recent research has suggested that men and
women demonstrate different patterns of talking in groups, an
*important feature of professional life for lawyers. In a study of
students at Harvard, men spoke more often than their women
peers, for longer periods, and tended to interrupt more frequently.
65
And Epstein's concluding comments in her study of women in
law66 similarly articulated an important difference of perspective
between men and women lawyers.
67
In contrast to this recognition of inherent difference, Catharine
MacKinnon has suggested that the different voice identified in
Gilligan's research clearly represents the voice of women as
dominated in our society by men, not an inherently different voice
but one that is constructed from existing power relationships
between men and women. In her view, the different voice is not
the voice of someone who has chosen to be more interested in
preserving relationships than in determining rights, but rather
62 Id, 63.
63 Christine Boyle, "Sexual Assault and the Feminist Judge" (1985), 1 Can.
J of Women and the Law 93.
64 Id, 103.
65 Catherine Krupnick, "Women and Men in the Classroom: Inequality and
its Remedies" (1985) On Teaching and Learning 18. The author also cites
similar studies conducted, including one by Rosabeth Moss Kanter in 1972
about women in corporate settings, with similar results. Id., 20. See also
Peggy McIntosh, "Feeling Like a Fraud" (Unpublished manuscript, 1985);
and Mary O'Brien and Sheilah McIntyre, "Patriarchal Hegemony and Legal
Education" (1986), 2 Can. J. of Women and the Law 69. See also a study
at Osgoode Hall Law School based on the Harvard study: Ian Attridge,
Annie Bunting, et aL "Gender in a Law School Classroom: Perceptions and
Practices" (Unpublished: 1988).
66 Epstein, Women in Law, supra note 38, 385.
67 Id., 385:
Lodged as they are in a web of many interwoven roles, women, more
than men, often take a view that extends beyond the traditional legal
mentality - developed by law schools - that Edmund Burke ...
claimed sharpened men's minds by making them narrow. Many women
lawyers today have not been permitted the luxury of narrowness because,
as outsiders, they have been sensitized to the insular qualities of law
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someone who has no rights and of necessity has developed a
concern for relationships. 68 For MacKinnon, the crucial issue is the
power of men to "define" and the corresponding powerlessness
of women; for her, the issue of gender for women lawyers is the
same as for all women:
Gender then becomes a question of how people who do not have
power are going to get some .... It is about how this romance with
gender, elaborately played out as either sameness or difference, is
going to be turned into something that is not going [to keep us
where we have been placed], but rather like something which values
us for what we are without keeping us there; not our freedom to
be masculine, but our right to have access to [what men have]
whether we do with it what they have done with it, or not.
69
(Emphasis in original)
In addition to MacKinnon's concerns, there are also concerns
about alternative dispute resolution (such as that evident in Amy's
decision-making and Menkle-Meadow's assessment) that may
"privatize" the legal process, thereby enabling sex discrimination
to occur without public scrutiny. 70 In the context of the legal
system as a whole, such "privatization" of decision-making may
further diminish the bargaining power of those who are less
powerful, frequently women.
Some of these concerns are appropriate. As MacKinnon has
pointed out, the idea of difference assumes a standard, just as the
idea of equality assumes a standard. And just as the standard in
the difference debate at the turn of the century was male, so is
the standard in the equality debate in the 1980's:
[Male power is what] Aristotle missed in his empiricist notion that
equality means treating likes alike and unlikes alike .... Why
should you have to be the same as a man to get what a man gets
simply because he is one? ... [The] question is, Why does maleness
provide an original entitlement, not questioned on the basis of its
gender, so that it is women.., who want to make a case of unequal
practice.... [The] outsider role, no matter what its pains and handicaps,
does give a perspective different from that of insiders with vested interests
in the existing structure. (Emphasis added).
68 I do not think that the way women reason morally is morality 'in a
different voice'. I think it is morality in a higher register, in the feminine
voice. Women value care because men have valued us according to the
care we give them, and we could probably use some. Women think in
relational terms because our existence is defined in relation to men.
Further, when you are powerless, you don't just speak differently. A lot,
you don't speak. Your speech is not just differently articulated, it is
silenced. Eliminated, gone.
Catharine MacKinnon, "Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimina-
tion", in Feminism Unmodified- Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1987) 32, 39.
69 Catharine MacKinnon in Isabel Marcus and Paul Spiegelman, moderators,
"Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law - A Conversation" (1985),
34 Buffalo LRev. 11, 28.
70 See, for example, Olsen, supra note 45; and O'Donovan, supra note 39.
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treatment? ... who have to show that they are men in every
relevant respect .... 71
Thus, the central question remains unanswered, awaiting further
research and analysis: what difference does it make that Clara
Brett Martin succeeded in becoming a lawyer in 1897, and what
difference should it make that the legal profession increasingly
includes large numbers of women as well as men? Beyond the
individual careers of individual women lawyers, what impact will
the advent of a significant number of women in the legal
profession have on the practice of law, on legal rules and concepts,
on the roles lawyers play in our society? Most importantly, will
women who become lawyers be just like men who are lawyers,
or will they bring a new dimension to lawyering?
Surely this question is one that should be addressed thoughtfully
and with imagination as we approach the 100th anniversary of
Clara Brett Martin's achievement: "to open the way to the bar for
others of my sex .... -72
71 MacKinnon, supra note 68, 37.
72 Newspaper clipping, Buffalo Express (undated); as quoted by Backhouse,
supra note 1, 22.
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